Belt and Road: India’s Dilemma

Although no significant breakthroughs were made on disputes between the two countries, the resumption of the strategic dialogue mechanism itself signified that China-India relations are stabilizing and returning to a track of sound development rather than constant deterioration.

On February 22, 2017, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui and Indian Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar held the first China-India Strategic Dialogue since Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office. The meeting marked the resurrection of another important communication mechanism between the two countries after the fourth China-India strategic economic dialogue held in October 2016.

As to whether India would attend the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in May this year, Jaishankar revealed that the Indian government was still considering it a possibility. Considering India’s diplomatic rhetoric history, if they say they’re “considering it,” usually it is a quite negative answer. At present, India is the only country among China’s neighbors not yet to officially voice support for the Belt and Road Initiative. According to India, the reason is that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a flagship project under the Initiative, passes through Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.

In early 2015, Indian strategic researcher Raja Mohan wrote that from the Chinese perspective it was a smart move to invite India to join the maritime Silk Road project, but New Delhi was in a dilemma: working together with China in the maritime domain or limiting Beijing’s influence in the Indian Ocean. However, from the perspective of economic cooperation, the Belt and Road Initiative meets the needs of the Modi administration’s “Make in India” plan and its ambition to expand international economic collaboration. The situation, however, would be different when New Delhi considers the Belt and Road Initiative from a geopolitical angle.

In his speech at the first Raisina Dialogue in 2016, Jaishankar offered a systematic description of India’s view on regional connectivity, which reflected the country’s geopolitical worries over the Belt and Road Initiative. He said that “connectivity initiatives based on different strategic interests were emerging on the Asian continent,” which he referred to Russia’s Euroasian Union, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Japan’s plan to expand Asian infrastructure investment, and the New Silk Road initiative proposed by the United States.

Jaishankar stressed that India can’t turn a blind eye to the endeavors of other countries to improve connectivity which will impact the future and evoke unnecessary competition without accepted security architecture in Asia. He added that connectivity was intended to reduce competition between countries in the region instead of intensifying it. “If we intend to create a multipolar world, the right thing to do now is to create a multipolar Asia,” he opined. “Only open consultation on future connectivity can help achieve this goal.”

In the eyes of the Indian government, regional connectivity inherently has geopolitical connotations, and security concerns should take priority over economic cooperation initiatives. From India’s perspective, forming a “multipolar Asia” must offset China’s advantage in overall strength. Thus, supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative would deviate from India’s overall diplomatic goal. However, India will have a difficult time enhancing the connectivity of South Asia and checking China’s influence through its own efforts. Consequently, India has turned to Japan for assistance in promoting connectivity projects such as domestic high-speed railways and the Chabahar Port project in Iran.

An awkward situation India faces is that Russia, one of its traditional strategic partners, has chosen to embrace the Belt and Road Initiative. Moreover, Russia is working with China and Mongolia to build the China-Russia-Mongolia Economic Corridor. From perspectives of both history and public opinion, Russia is an intimate friend of India. However, Russia joined hands with Pakistan, India’s top rival, to hold a joint military drill in 2016. Since the beginning of 2017, rumors have swirled that Russia and Iran are seeking to join the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. If this becomes reality, India will fall into an even worse bind. As Jaishankar noted at the China-India Strategic Dialogue, India’s territorial claims in the disputed areas will be directly impacted if the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor becomes a multilateral project.

Another sticky situation for India is that most small South Asian countries welcome China’s economic presence in the region and have publicly expressed enthusiasm and support for the Belt and Road Initiative. For instance, Bangladesh has expressed excitement about the prospects of substantive progress in the construction of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor, but haven’t before dared take assertive action due to India’s reluctance towards the project. Nepal hopes to break its geographical barriers to become a “bridge” or “passage” between China and India via a China-Nepal-India Economic Corridor built as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. However, India’s negative posture towards the idea has tied the country’s hands. If India continues to distance itself from economic cooperation projects involving China and South Asian countries, all of the participants will certainly move further from India, which is not in its best interests.

Whether to join the Belt and Road Initiative has become a thorny, awkward situation for India.

The author is deputy director of the Center for South Asian Studies at Fudan University.